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in the harbor sank or that the waves generated by the storm were so severe that they would have 
contributed to the loss regardless of the incomplete engine work. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for Progressive. It also held that Hart presented no genuine issue of material fact 
because he failed to present evidence to refute Progressive's prima facie showing of negligence 
that Hart's inadequate maintenance was the dominant cause of the FOOT LOOSE's sinking. 
John D'Ambrosio 
Class of 2009 
COURT OF APPEALS REJECTS DISTRICT COURT'S ENFORCEMENT OF 
OVERBROAD EXCULPATORY CLAUSE 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision to narrow and enforce defendant's overbroad exculpatory 
clause. The court considered the clause's boiler-plate nature, over-breadth, 
lack of clarity, and attorney fee structure in deciding that enforcement would 
be against public policy. 
Mark Broadley v. Mashpee Neck Marina, Inc. 
United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 
471 F.3d 272 
(Decided December 22, 2006) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mark Broadley ("Broadley"), brought a negligence action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Mashpee Neck Marina 
("Marina"), for injuries sustained as a result of improper dock maintenance. Broadley, who 
rented a seasonal mooring at the marina, fractured his ankle when his foot became trapped 
between a fixed dock and the attached floating dock where his vessel was moored. Broadley 
alleged that the Marina was responsible for the accident because the Marina could have 
prevented exposing dock gaps by affixing a flexible material to the topside of the docks or 
ensuring the docks themselves were · more tightly secured. The Marina contended that 
Broadley's negligence claim was barred by the exculpatory clause contained in the rental 
agreement. Broadley contended that admiralty law prohibits use of exculpatory clauses which 
completely immunize against ordinary negligence or bar claims for gross negligence or 
intentional wrongdoing. S. C. State Ports Auth. ., v. Silver Anchor, S.A., 23 F.3d 842, 846 n. 3 (4th 
Cir. 1994). The exculpatory clause read : 
The OWNER [Broadley] warrants and [covenants] that . . .  the OWNER . . .  will [not] make 
any claims, demands, causes of action of any kind and nature, or obtain or enforce any 
judgments, executions or levies thereon . . .  against MARINA, its officers, directors, agents, 
servants, or its employees, arising out of any damage, loss, personal injury or death 
suffered by [him]. . .  The OWNER . . . agree[s] and covenant[s] that [he] will defend, 
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indemnify and save MARINA hannless from any and all of such claims, demands, causes 
of action, judgments and executions, and the MARINA shall be entitled to responsible 
attorneys fees in the event of breach of the OWNER's covenant hereunder. 
The district court decided to narrow the overbroad exculpatory clause and apply it to the 
extent it covered claims for ordinary negligence. Since Broadley asserted no claim for gross 
negligence or reckless negligence, the district court granted summary judgment for the Marina. 
On appeal, Broadley reasserted that controlling admiralty law prohibits clauses which fully 
immunize against ordinary negligence; for support, Broadley cites the Supreme Court's decision 
in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), and the 1st circuits decision in La 
Esperanza de P.R . .  , Inc v. Perez Y Cia de P.R. , Inc., 124 F.3d 10 (l5t Cir.1997). 
Bisso, which was decided in the context of towing contracts and specifically concerned 
with the threat of "monopolistic compulsion," has been unevenly applied between circuits. Two 
circuits plainly accept Bisso and would allow a release for negligence. One circuit limits Bisso 
to situations of unequal bargaining power. La Esperanza, a 1st circuit decision, upheld an 
exculpatory clause focused on ordinary negligence. The court reasoned that application was 
proper so long as the terms were "expressed clearly in contracts entered into freely by parties of 
equal bargaining power." !d. at 19. As a result, the Court of Appeals surmised that absent a 
showing of unequal bargaining power, a narrowly tailored exculpatory clause which bars claims 
for ordinary negligence should be upheld. 
The cases cited by Broadley were only of marginal support, for he never alleged unequal 
bargaining power. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals continued its inquiry. The Court of 
Appeals questioned the appropriateness of the district court's decision to reform and then enforce 
the overbroad exculpatory clause. The Restatement 2nd of Contracts § 184 provides for situations 
where a contract is overbroad. "A court may treat only part of a term as unenforceable .. .if the 
party who seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
standards of fair dealing." However, a comment to the rule further advises that, "the fact that 
the [overbroad] term is contained in a standard form supplied by the dominant party argues 
against aiding him in this request." !d. § 184 cmt. b. 
The Court of Appeals relies on the Restatement 2nd as an analytical starting point and 
continued to consider the remaining public policy concerns. If enforced, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that the over-breadth of the clause would discourage legitimate claims for reckless, 
gross, and intentional negligence that would otherwise have been brought. Additionally, since 
the clause lacked clear and express reference to negligence suits, it provided inadequate warning 
to the contracting party. Lastly, the portion of the clause transferring Marina's attorney fees to 
the party bringing suit was an unwarranted deterrent. Without the guidance of controlling case 
law, the Court of Appeals decided that it would not be proper to uphold the overbroad 
exculpatory clause under these conditions. The Court of Appeals further extended all of the 
previously mentioned criteria to reject application of the contract's severability clause. The case 
was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with each side bearing costs. 
Charles I. Steerman 
Class of 2008 
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